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Lorndale: Tax Law

TAX LAW

IN RE KROY (EUROPE) LIMITED: WHETHER
A CORPORATION MAY AMORTIZE AND
DEDUCT LOAN FEES INCURRED IN
FINANCING A STOCK REDEMPTION

I.

INTRODUCTION

In In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, l the Ninth Circuit held
that a corporation could amortize and deduct fees which it
incurred in borrowing funds used to redeem stock under §
162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. 2 Section 162(a) allows a
corporation to deduct ordinary and necessary business expenses. 3 Kroy required the court to decide whether § 162(k) of the
Internal Revenue Code,4 an exception to § 162(a), applied to

1. In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, 27 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 1994) (per McLaughlin,
J.; the other panel members were Leavy, J., and Reinhardt, J.).
.
2. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 370. The pertinent portions of I.R.C. § 162(a) provide:
"[tlhere shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business ..." I.R.C. § 162(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
3. See I.R.C. § 162(a).
4. The pertinent portions of I.R.C. § 162(k) provide:
(1) IN GENERAL. - Except as provided in paragraph (2), no
deduction otherwise allowable shall be allowed under this
chapter for any amount paid or incurred by a corporation
in connection with the redemption of its stock.
(2) EXCEPl'IONS. - Paragraph (1) shall not apply to (A) CERTAIN SPECIFIC DEDUCTIONS. - Any (j) deduction allowable under section
163 (relating to interest), or
(ii) deduction for dividends paid (within the
meaning of section 561).
I.R.C. § 162(k) (1988) (emphasis in original).
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these fees and would preclude their deduction. 5 Section 162(k)
disallows deduction of any expenses incurred "in connection
with" a stock redemption. s The Ninth Circuit determined that
§ 162(k) did not apply to the fees because the fees were incurred in a separate borrowing transaction which was not "in
connection with" the stock redemption. 7
In its decision, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court decision and affirmed an earlier bankruptcy court holding. s
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Kroy is a corporation that manufactures computer-based
lettering systems. 9 In 1986, Kroy's management decided to
take Kroy private in a leveraged buyout transaction (hereinafter "LBO").IO Kroy lacked sufficient funds to repurchase its
stock.ll Therefore, Kroy borrowed $60.6 million from First
Bank of Minneapolis and Quest Equities Corp. to finance the
LBO.12 To obtain the loans, Kroy paid loan fees totaling
$4,091,170. 13 For tax purposes, Kroy amortized and deducted
5. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 368.
6. See I.R.C. § 162(k).
7. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 370.
8. See id. at 368.
9. In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, 27 F.3d 367, 368 (9th Cir. 1994). Kroy is
principally engaged in the manufacture and marketing of computer-based lettering
systems as well as the sale of signs and sign systems. In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1249, at *2 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Feb. 14, 1992).
10. See In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, 27 F.3d 367, 368 (9th Cir. 1994). In
December 1986, Kroy became a private company in a leveraged buyout transaction
in which Kroy merged with Kappa Acquisition Corporation to form a new merged
Kroy. Kroy, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1249, at *2. Kappa was formed for the purpose of
taking Kroy private. [d. The stockholders of the new Kroy were pre-LBO Kroy
management, several investors and the Kappa Acquisition Corporation Employee
Stock Ownership Plan. [d. All pre-LBO common shares of Kroy which were outstanding prior to the merger were bought back for cash. In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, No. CIV. 92-491, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17169, at *2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 29, 1992).
11. Kroy, 27 F.3d at 368.
12. [d.
13. [d. The loan fees consisted of: i) an advisory fee of $1,200,000 and a place-

ment fee of $625,000 to Bankers Trust Corporation, ii) a credit arrangement and
facility fee of $1,000,000 to Quest, iii) a commitment fee, closing fee and bank
agent fee totaling $667,000 to First Bank, and iv) $599,170 for reimbursement of
the legal and accounting fees of Bankers Trust, Quest and First Bank. [d. The
court noted that Bankers Trust acted as Kroy's investment banker, but did not
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the loan fees under § 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code 14 as
ordinary and necessary business expenses. 15
The Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter "IRS") audited
Kroy's tax returns for the tax years ending March 1986, 1987,
1988, 1989 and 1990, and disallowed Kroy's amortization deductions for the loan fees. 1s This disallowance resulted in a
net tax deficiency for Kroy.17 In 1990,Kroy voluntarily filed
for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. IS
The government submitted a proof of claim 19 to the bankruptcy court for unpaid corporate income taxes. 20 Kroy objected to
the deficiency claim and requested that the bankruptcy
court21 determine its tax liability under 11 U.S.C. § 505. 22
The parties submitted the dispute to the bankruptcy court on
stipulated facts and cross motions for summary judgment.23
The bankruptcy court granted Kroy's motion for summary
judgment, holding that the loan fees were ordinary and necessary business expenses which could be amortized and deducted
under § 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. 24 The bankruptcy court determined that § 162(k) of the Internal Revenue
Code, which disallows deduction of any expenses incurred "in
loan funds to Kroy. 1d. at 368 n.1.
14. See supra note 2 for the text of I.R.C. § 162(a).
15. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 368.
16. 1d.
17. 1d. The IRS determined that Kroy owed a tax deficiency of $270,391 for
the taxable year ending March 1988. Kroy, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1249, at *4. Additionally, the IRS determined that Kroy made overpayments to the IRS for 1983
and 1986 equaling $137,291. 1d. In lieu of requesting a refund, Kroy applied that
amount to the amount owing so that Kroy owed a balance of $133,640. 1d. This
amount plus accrued interest of $109,015 equalled $242,655 which was the total
deficiency claimed by the government. See id. at *4-*5.
18. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 368; 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-63 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
19. A proof of claim is a statement under oath filed in a bankruptcy proceeding by a creditor in which the creditor sets forth the amount owed and sufficient
detail to identify the basis for the claim. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 845 (6th ed.
1991).
20. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 368.
21. United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Arizona.
22. Kroy, 27 F.3d at 368. Section 505 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
provides that a bankruptcy court may determine a debtor's tax liability that has
not been contested before or adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal
prior to a debtor's filing in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 505 (1994).
23. Kroy, 27 F.3d at 368.
24. See Kroy, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1249, at *12.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995

3

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 8

154

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:151

connection with" a stock redemption, did not apply to the loan
fees and, thus, would not preclude the deductions. 25 The court
reasoned that the loan fees were not incurred "in connection
with" the stock redemption within the meaning of § 162(k),
but, instead, were incurred in a separate borrowing transaction. 26 The government appealed to the district court.27
On appeal, the district court28 reversed and disallowed
Kroy's deductions for the loan fees. 29 The district court held
that § 162(k) applied to the loan fees and precluded their deduction. 30 The court reasoned that the loan fees were incurred
"in connection with" a stock redemption because Kroy paid the
loan fees to secure debt capital which was used to repurchase
the stock. 31 Kroy appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 32
III. BACKGROUND
Whether § 162(k) of the Internal Revenue Code 33 applies
to and, thus, precludes deduction of expenses that a corporation incurs in securing a loan to finance a stock redemption
has implications for most LBO and stock redemption completed
since the enactment of the statute in 1986. 34 There are hundreds of millions of dollars, and perhaps billions of dollars, at
stake in amortization deductions for fees that companies pay to
investment bankers, financial institutions, lawyers, and accountants to handle the buyback of their stock. 35
The courts36 and the IRS 37 have previously determined

25. See id.
26. See id. at *10.
27. Kroy, 27 F.3d at 368.
28. United States District Court, District of Arizona.
29. Kroy, 27 F.3d at 368.
30. See Kroy, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17169, at *13.
31. See id. at "'10.
32. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 368.
33. See supra note 4 for the text of I.R.C. § 162(k).
34. See Thomas Pratt, Court Rules LBO Debt Fees Non·Deductible, MERGERS
AND ACQUISITIONS REPORT, Nov. 30, 1992, at 1.
35. Claudia MacLachlan, Conflict Emerges In Rulings On Fee Deductions; The
Supreme Court May Have to Settle a Split Over Deducting Fees Paid In LBO
Financings, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at A7.
36. See, e.g., Detroit Consol. Theaters Inc. v. Comm'r, 133 F.2d 200 (6th Cir.
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that a corporation may amortize and deduct fees and expenses
related to acquiring a loan over the life of the loan as ordinary
and necessary business expenses under § 162(a).38 However,
the enactment of § 162(k) raises a question as to whether fees
incurred to finance a redemption of corporate stock are subject
to this treatment. 39 Section 162(k) provides an exception to
the general rule of § 162(a) that ordinary and necessary business expenses are deductible. 40 By its terms, § 162(k) denies a
deduction for "any amount paid or incurred by a corporation in
connection with the redemption of its stock."41
Congress enacted § 162(k) to address the deductibility of
"greenmail" payments.42 "Greenmail" payments are payments
that a corporation makes to repurchase its stock from shareholders intent on a hostile takeover of the repurchasing corporation. 43 A corporation's payment for repurchase or redemption of its own stock had long been viewed as a capital expense
with the consequence that both the repurchase payments and
the legal, brokerage, and accounting fees incurred incident to
the transaction could not be deducted. 44 However, during the

1942) (per curiam) (finding that commissions paid during the taxable year which
represented the cost to petitioner of securing two long-term loans were not deductible in full in the year when paid but should be spread ratably over the period of
the loans). See also Anover Realty Corp. v. Comm'r, 33 T.C. 671, 675 (1960) (determining that it is proper for a taxpayer to amortize the expenses it incurred in
securing the mortgage loans over the life of the loans).
37. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 86-67, 1986-1 C.B. 238 (expenses incurred to obtain a
loan are capital expenditures that must be amortized over the period of the loan).
38. See Glenn N. Goergen & Gus H. Vlahadamis, Taxability of Fees in Financing a Stock Redemption, THE TAX ADVISER, March 1993, at 74. See supra note 2
for the text of I.R.C. § 162(a).
39. See Goergen & Vlahadamis, supra note 38, at 74.
40. Lee A. Sheppard, The Tax Treatment of LBO Fees, TAX NOTES TODAY,
Sept. 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, at 94 TNT 185-5.
41. I.R.C. § 162(k). See supra note 4 for the text of I.R.C. § 162(k).
42. See' S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 223 (1986). The Senate Committee Report provides the following as the reason for enacting I.R.C. § 162(k):
The [Senate) [C)ommittee understands that some corporate
taxpayers are taking the [erroneous) position that expenditures incurred to repurchase stock from stockholders to
prevent a hostile takeover of the corporation by such
shareholders - so-called "greenmail" payments - are deductible business expenses.
S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 223 (1986).
43. See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 485 (6th ed. 1991).
44. Elliot Pisem, Courts Split on Deductibility of Loan Fees, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 1,

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995

5

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 8

156

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:151

corporate takeover frenzy of the 1980s, corporate taxpayers
relied upon Five Star Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner45 as
authority to justify deduction of such stock repurchase or
"greenmail" payments. 46 Consequently, Congress added a new
provision, subsection (k) of § 162 of the Internal Revenue Code,
to provide an explicit rule prohibiting deduction of "greenmail"
payments, thereby reversing the effect of Five Star. 47
However, the language and legislative history of § 162(k)
indicate that the statute may transcend simple clarification of
the law concerning "greenmail" payments. 48 Congress' use of
the words "otherwise allowable"49 to describe the deductions
to which § 162(k) applies may suggest intent to cut off previously permissible deductions. 50 In other words, deductions
that had previously been allowable in other contexts would no
longer be allowable in the context of a stock redemption under
§ 162(k).51 In addition, the Senate Committee Report, which
the Conference Committee Report generally follows, states that
§ 162(k) is not limited to hostile takeover situations, but applies to any corporate stock redemption. 52 Notwithstanding

1994, at 5 (citing STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., 2D
SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 277 (1987».
45. Five Star Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 355 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1966). In Five Star,
the court held that a corporation could deduct as ordinary and necessary business
expenses funds paid to redeem stock where such redemption was necessary for the
survival of the corporation. See In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, 27 F.3d 367, 370
(9th Cir. 1994) (citing Five Star, 355 F.2d at 727).
46. See Pisem, supra note 44, at 5.
47. See id.
48. Fort Howard Corp. v. Comm'r, No. 6362-92, 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63,
at *26 (T.C. Aug. 24, 1994).
49. I.R.C. § 162(k) provides in pertinent part: "no deduction otherwise allowable shall be allowed under this chapter for any amount paid or incurred by a
corporation in connection with the redemption of its stock." I.R.C. § 162(k).
50. See Sheppard, supra note 40, at 94 TNT 185-5.
51. See id.
52. See S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 223 (1986). The Senate Committee Report provides guidance as to the scope of Congress' intended application
of I.R.C. § 162(k):
The committee wishes to provide expressly that all expenditures by a corporation incurred in purchasing its own
stock, whether representing direct consideration for the
stock, a premium payment above the apparent stock value, or costs incident to the purchase, are nonamortizable
capital expenditures. . . .
This provision is not limited to hostile takeover
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the Senate Committee Report, the intended scope of § 162(k)
remains uncertain because the Conference Committee Report
does not contain this statement. 53 Thus, the consequence of
the statute's language and legislative history may be that §
162(k) is more than a mere clarification of the law concerning
the deductibility of "greenmail" payments. 54 Section 162(k)
may, in a broad and sweeping manner, have been intended to
prevent the deduction of any redemption-related expenses. 55
The United States Tax Court, in Fort Howard Corp. v.
Commissioner,56 considered whether § 162(k) precludes a corporate taxpayer from amortizing and deducting the costs and
fees which were paid to obtain debt capital used in an LBO.57
The tax court held that § 162(k) is applicable in these circumstances and that amortization and deduction of the costs and
fees are, thus, precluded. 58 T:p.e tax court found that the language59 and legislative history60 of § 162(k) support a broad

situations, but applies to any corporate stock redemption.
The committee intends that amounts subject to this provision will include amounts paid to repurchase stock, premiums paid for the stock, legal, accounting, brokerage,
transfer agent, appraisal and similar fees incurred in
connection with the repurchase and any other expenditure
that is necessary or incident to the repurchase. . . .
S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 223 (1986).
53. See, e.g., In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, 27 F.3d 367, 370 (9th Cir. 1994)
(finding that § 162(k) is a codification and clarification of existing law concerning
"greenmail" payments, although the court did not use the term "greenmail."). But
see Fort Howard Corp., 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63, at *26-*27 (stating that §
162(k) is more than a mere clarification of the law concerning "greenmail" payments and that § 162(k) overrides existing law where costs associated with any
stock redemption are concerned).
54. See Sheppard, supra note 40, at 94 TNT 185-5.
55. See id.
56. Fort Howard Corp. v. Comm'r, No. 6362-92, 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63
(T.C. Aug. 24, 1994).
57. Id. at *14. In Fort Howard Corp., the corporate taxpayer, Fort Howard
Corp., incurred expenses in obtaining loans to finance the repurchase of its stock
in a leveraged buyout transaction. See id. at *11-*12. The corporate taxpayer amortized and deducted these expenditures on its 1988 income tax return. See id. at
*12. The IRS disallowed these deductions on the ground that § 162(k) precludes
such deductions. See id. at *2.
58. See Fort Howard Corp., 1994 U.S. Tax. Ct. LEXIS 63, at *19.
59. The tax court reasoned that the words in a revenue act should be interpreted in their ordinary, everyday sense. Id. at *16. It noted that the phrase "in
connection with" has been interpreted broadly and means "associated with, or
related." See id. at *16-*17. Further, the tax court reasoned that events or ele-
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interpretation of the statute and require its applicatiori to the
fees paid to obtain debt capital for an LBO.61
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
In In re Kroy (Europe) Limited,62 the Ninth Circuit first
determined that § 162(k) of the Internal Revenue Code63 did
not apply to and, thus, would not preclude deduction of the
loan fees.64 Subsequently, the court made its determination
that the loan fees could be amortized and deducted as ordinary
and necessary business expenses under § 162(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code. 55
A.

SECTION 162(K) DOES NOT PRECLUDE AMORTIZATION OF
THE LOAN FEES

The court set the groundwork for its analysis by first addressing whether § 162(k) of the Internal Revenue Code precludes amortization and deduction of the loan fees in view of
the fact that Kroy procured and used the loan to redeem its
stock. 66

ments are "connected" when they are "logically related." Id. at *17. As a factual
matter, the court found that Fort Howard Corp. used the debt capital obtained via
the expenditures in question to finance the redemption. Id. The court, accordingly,
concluded that there was a clear, logical relation between Fort Howard Corp.'s
stock redemption, the corresponding need for financing, and the costs incurred to
obtain that financing. Id. Thus, the tax court determined that the loan fees were
incurred "in connection with" the stock redemption with the consequence that their
deduction is precluded under § 162(k). See id. at *19.
60. The tax court cited the Conference Committee Report which provides in
pertinent part: "the phrase 'in connection with a redemption' is intended to be construed broadly...." Id. at *20 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 168 (1986».
61. See Fort Howard Corp., 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63, at *19.
62. In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, 27 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 1994).
63. See supra note 4 for the text of I.R.C. § 162(k).
64. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 370.
65. See id. See supra note 2 for the text of I.R.C. § 162(a).
66. See In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, 27 F.3d 367, 369 (9th Cir. 1994).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol25/iss1/8

8

Lorndale: Tax Law

1995]

1.

TAX LAW

159

Narrow Interpretation of § 162(k): Plain Meaning of
§ 162(k) Is Not Conclusive As To Its Application to the
Loan Fees

The Ninth Circuit first considered whether the plain
meaning of § 162(k) of the Internal Revenue Code necessarily
includes the loan fees because they stem from borrowings used
to finance a share repurchase program. 67 The court found the
statute's plain meaning to be inconclusive as to whether Kroy's
loan fees are to be considered as incurred "in connection with"
the stock redemption. 68
After making the threshold determination that the plain
meaning of § 162(k) does not require application of the statute
to Kroy's loan fees, the Ninth Circuit considered two additional
arguments made by the government which related to interpretation of the statute. 69 First, the court rejected the
government's suggestion that the words "otherwise allowable,,,70 which Congress used to describe the deductions to
which the statute applies, indicate that deductions which were
allowable in other contexts are no longer allowable in the context of a stock redemption. 71 The Ninth Circuit dismissed this
argument by reasoning that before § 162(k) can be applied, the
court, nevertheless, must determine whether or not an expen67. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 368-69.
68. See id. at 369. The court rejected the government's principal contention
that § 162(k) is to be interpreted to include the loan fees. See id. It found that
this interpretation of § 162(k) requires that the business purpose for the use of
the borrowed funds be ascertained to determine deductibility. [d. The court noted
that under the government's theory, if the business purpose for borrowing the
funds is to redeem stock, then the loan fees are not deductible. [d. However, if
the funds are borrowed for some other business purpose, then the identical loan
fees may be deductible. [d. The court concluded that this is the uncertainty which
the Supreme Court rejected in Woodward u. Commissioner and United States u.
Gilmore. [d. See infra notes 80, 84 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Woodward and Gilmore. Further, the court found an expansive reading of § 162(k)
unnecessary because it reasoned the statute to be a codification and clarification of
existing law specifically concerning the treatment of funds paid to redeem stock in
order to avoid a hostile takeover. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 370. Accordingly, the court
dismissed the government's argument that the plain meaning of the phrase "in
connection with" the stock redemption necessarily includes the loan fees. See id. at
369.
69. See id. at 369 n.3.
70. See supra note 4 for the text of I.R.C. § 162(k).
71. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 369 n.3.
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diture was incurred "in connection with" a stock redemption. 72
The government's second argument, which related to statutory interpretation, concerned the exception under § 162(k)
which permits the deduction of interest expense73 incurred in
connection with a stock redemption. 74 The government suggested that the existence of this exception raised an inference
that other loan-related costs, such as loan fees, could not be
deducted. 76 The court refused to draw this inference. 76 The
court reasoned that Congress did not need to specifically include an exception for expenditures such as loan fees because
these expenditures had been deductible for many years. 77 An
exception for loan fees would only be required if the loan fees
were incurred "in connection with" a stock redemption. 78
After the court concluded that a literal construction of §
162(k) failed to provide guidance as to whether the loan fees
were incurred "in connection with" the stock redemption, it
confronted the issue of determining which test to apply.79

2.

Selection of the Origin of the Claim Test to Determine
Whether or Not the Loan Fees Were Incurred In Connection
With the Stock Redemption

The court concluded that the "origin of the claim" test
established by the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Gilmore 80 was the proper legal inquiry for determin72. See id.
73. See supra note 4 for the text of I.R.C. § 162{k).
74. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 369 n.3.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 369 n.3. The court concluded that the interest exception was included in § 162{k) to provide deductibility in the situation where a
corporation pays interest on a promissory note issued to a shareholder whose stock
was repurchased. 1d. Absent the exception, § 162{k) would preclude deduction of
such interest expense. 1d.
79. See id. at 369.
80. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963). In Gilmore, the issue was
whether litigation expenses incurred by the husband in divorce proceedings were
deductible as a business expense, rather than nondeductible as a personal expense.
See id. at 40. The husband argued that the litigation expenses were incurred to
resist the wife's claim to his assets which included controlling stock interests in
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ing whether or not the loan fees were incurred "in connection
with" the stock redemption8l within the meaning of §
162(k).82 Under the "origin of the claim" test, a court examines the origin and character of the taxpayer's expenditure, but
does not consider the taxpayer's motives or purposes in incurring the expenditure. 83 The Ninth Circuit adopted this approach on the ground that the Supreme Court has relied on
this test to determine the nature and, thus, the deductibility of
taxpayer expenditures. 84 Moreover, the court noted that the

three General Motors automobile dealerships. See id. at 40-41. The husband was
the president and principal managing officer of the three dealerships. See id. at
41. The Supreme Court held that the "origin and character of the claim with respect to which an expense was incurred, rather than its potential consequences
upon the fortunes of the taxpayer, is the controlling basic test of whether the
expense was 'business' or 'personal' and, hence, whether it is deductible or
not. . . ." Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 49. Consequently, the court found that the origin
of the husband's expenditures was in the divorce proceedings and, therefore, the
expenditures were personal and nondeductible even though they had been incurred
for a business purpose. Kroy, 27 F.3d at 370 (citing Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 51-52).
81. Contra Fort Howard Corp. v. Comm'r, No. 6362-92, 1994 U.S. Tax Ct.
LEXIS 63, at *33-*40 (T.C. Aug. 24, 1994) (reasoning that the appropriate test for
determining applicability of § 162(k) to the loan fees is found in the language of
the statute itself and that application of the origin of the claim test is unnecessary).
82. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 369.
83. See Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 49 .
. 84. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 369-70 (citing Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 49; Woodward v.
Comm'r, 397 U.S. 572, 578 (1970». The origin of the claim test was used to characterize an expenditure as either business or personal in Gilmore and to determine whether taxpayer expenditures were deductible business expenses or nondeductible capital expenditures in Woodward. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 369-70. In Woodward, the taxpayers were majority stockholders of an Iowa corporation who had
voted in favor of a perpetual extension of the corporate charter and had, consequently, incurred the obligation to purchase stock owned by dissenting shareholders at its real value. See Woodward, 397 U.S. at 573. As the two parties could not
. agree on the real value of the stock, appraisal litigation ensued in which the taxpayers incurred $25,000 in expenses. See id. at 573-74. The taxpayers deducted
these expenses as ordinary and necessary business expenses on their federal income tax returns. See id. at 574. The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the
deduction because the fees "represented capital expenditures incurred in connection
with the acquisition of capital stock of a corporation." [d. The Supreme Court
found that the proper inquiry for determining whether the fees were deductible
business expenses or nondeductible capital expenditures was the "origin of the
claim" test. See id. at 578. Significantly, the Court rejected the "primary purpose"
test which required examining the business purpose for which the expenditure was
incurred. See Woodward, 397 U.S. at 577. The Supreme Court noted that the
"primary purpose" test was "uncertain and difficult" and that a test based upon
the taxpayer's purpose for the expenditure would encourage resort to "formalisms
and artificial distinctions." See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 370 (citing Woodward, 397 U.S. at
577). Accordingly, the Supreme Court applied the "origin of the claim" test and
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"origin of the claim" test and § 162(k), when interpreted narrowly, yield consistent results. 85 Expenditures which have
their "origin" in a stock redemption transaction are nondeductible, while those expenditures having their "origin" in a separate, although related, transaction remain deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses under § 162(a).86

3.

Application of the Origin of the Claim Test to the Loan
Fees

The Ninth Circuit applied the "origin of the claim" test to
Kroy's loan fees and found that the origin of Kroy's liability for
the loan fees was the borrowing transaction and not the stock
redemption transaction. 87 For federal income tax purposes,
the court reasoned that the stock redemption was a transaction
separate and distinct from the borrowing transaction. 88 The
court found that the loan fees were incurred as compensation
for services provided to Kroy by its investment banker and
lenders in the loan transaction. 89 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held
that § 162(k) does not apply as the loan fees were not incurred
"in connection with" the stock redemption. 90
B. LOAN FEES ARE AMORTIZABLE AND DEDUCTIBLE BUSINESS
EXPENSE UNDER § 162(A)
The court subsequently considered whether the loan fees
could be amortized and deducted under § 162(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code. 91 The courts and the IRS have traditionally
concluded that the fees were properly treated as part of the cost of the stock and
were nondeductible capital expenditures. See Woodward, 397 U.S. at 579. The
origin of the claim was the acquisition of the capital stock. See ill. The fees were
incurred in establishing a purchase price which is clearly part of the acquisition
process. See id.
85. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 369.
86. See ill.
87. See In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, 27 F.3d 367, 369 (9th Cir. 1994).
88. See ill. at 370.
89. [d.

90. See id.
91. See In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, 27 F.3d 367, 368 (9th Cir. 1994). The
government did not argue that a corporation could not amortize and deduct under
§ 162(a) expenses which it incurred to borrow funds for purposes not covered by §
162(k). See id.
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treated loan fees as amortizable over the life of the related
loan. 92 Because the loan fees at issue were incurred as compensation for services provided to Kroy by its investment banker and lenders in connection with securing a loan, the court
found that the loan fees could be amortized and deducted as
ordinary and necessary business expenses under § 162(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code. 93
V. CRITIQUE
Stripped of all nuance, the opinions of the Ninth Circuit
and the United States Tax Court disagree over how broadly
the words "in connection with a redemption"94 are to be interpreted. 95 The Ninth Circuit view in In re Kroy (Europe) Limited96 was that § 162(k)97 does not reach loan fees incurred in
financing a stock redemption, whereas, the tax court view in
Fort Howard Corp. v. Commissioner9s was that the statute
should be read broadly to encompass all expenses with a nexus
to the redemption transaction. 99
CommentatorslOO have suggested that § 162(k) is not to
be reduced, as the Ninth Circuit and the tax court have done,

92. See Glenn N. Goergen & Gus H. Vlahadamis, Taxability of Fees in Financ·
ing a Stock Redemption, THE TAX ADVISER, March 1993, at 74. See supra notes
36-38, and infra note 104, and accompanying text for a discussion of the treatment
of loan fees by the courts and the IRS.
93. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 370.
94. See supra note 4 for the text of I.R.C. § 162(k).
95. Richard W. Bailine and Christine W. Booth, Kroy: 'Bungling' Ninth Circuit
Still Got It Right, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Li·
brary, TNT File, at 94 TNT 215-62.
96. In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, 27 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 1994).
97. See supra note 4 for the text of I.R.C. § 162(k).
98. Fort Howard Corp v. Comm'r, No. 6362-92, 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63
(T.C. Aug. 24, 1994). See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of Fort Howard Corp. v. Comm'r.
99. See Bailine & Booth, supra note 95, at 94 TNT 215-62.
100. See, e.g., Bailine & Booth, supra note 95, at 94 TNT 215-62 (recognizing
that the crucial preliminary inquiry under § 162(k) is whether the expenses at
issue are "deductions otherwise allowable"). See also Lee A. Sheppard, The Tax
Treatment of LBO Fees, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 20, 1994, available in LEXIS,
Fedtax Library, TNT File, at 94 TNT 185-5 (stating that the words "in connection
with a stock redemption" used in § 162(k) are important, but the words "no deduction otherwise allowable under this chapter shall be allowed" may be more impor'
tant).
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to the five words "in connection with a redemption" when determining whether or not the statute applies to an expenditure. lOl A faithful reading of the statute would include the
crucial preliminary inquiry of whether the expenses at is'sue
are "deduction[s] otherwise allowable."102 In other words, no
inquiry about whether a particular expense was incurred "in
connection with a redemption" can be undertaken until it is
first determined that the expense at issue is an "otherwise
allowable deduction."103
Application of this two-step inquiry to determine if §
162(k) applies to and, thus, precludes deduction of Kroy's loan
fees yields the following result. If an expense is a loan fee, it
will be a "deduction otherwise allowable" because of longstanding precedent which permits amortization deductions for
loan fees over the lives of the related loans. l04 Consequently,
the loan fees will next be subject to the "in connection with a
redemption" inquiry.105 However, if the expense is a loan fee,
then it must have been incurred in connection with a loan, and
not "in connection with a redemption."106 Therefore, although
the loan fee will be within the universe of expenses to which §
162(k) applies (it is a "deduction otherwise allowable"), it will
not be affected by the proscriptive language of the statute
because it is not "in connection with a redemption."107 Consequently, § 162(k) does not preclude Kroy from amortizing
and deducting the loan fees. lOS
On the other hand, an expense that is a redemption expense will be treated differently under § 162(k). Redemption
expenses are not, and never have been, "deductions otherwise

101. See BaiJine & Booth, supra note 95, at 94 TNT 215-62.
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. See id. See, e.g., Cagle v. Comm'r, 539 F.2d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating that the costs of obtaining a loan are capital expenditures which should be
capitalized and deducted pro rata over the life of the loan); Enoch v. Comm'r, 57
T.C. 781, 794-795 (1972) (finding that a loan fee is compensation for services rendered in obtaining a loan and that a loan fee is a capital expenditure amortizable
over the life of the loan).
105. See Bailine & Booth, supra note 95, at 94 TNT 215-62.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id.
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allowable. 'H09 Thus, for redemption expenses, the proscriptive
language of § 162(k) would never come into play and redemption expenses would continue to be treated as non-deductible
capital expenditures. 11o
Application of § 162(k) in this two-step manner to expenditures in question yields sensible results. It does not alter the
practice of permitting the amortization of loan fees over the
lives of the related loans.l11 Nor does it affect the long-standing custom of treating redemption expenses as non-deductible
capital expenditures. ll2 Moreover, § 162(k) viewed in this
manner does achieve its principal legislative goal of clarifying
the treatment of "greenmail" payments.113 Section 162(k) removes any doubt about the possible validity of Five Star Manufacturing v. Commissioner 114 as support for deducting
"greenmail" payments. 115
Even though the Ninth Circuit correctly held that § 162(k)
did not apply to Kroy's loan fees and, thus, would not preclude
their deduction under § 162(a), a more satisfying analysis
would have included consideration of the important initial text
of § 162(k) which contains the words "deductions otherwise
allowable."116 By failing to consider these words, the court
missed an opportunity to provide a sound analytical framework
for courts deciding questions arising under § 162(k).

109. [d. (citing Five Star Mfg. v. Comm'r, 355 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1966) as a
single exception). The general rule governing share repurchases and associated
legal, accounting, and banking costs is that such expenditures are to be capitalized. See Sheppard, supra note 100, at 94 TNT 185-5.
110. See Bailine & Booth, supra note 95, at 94 TNT 215-62.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. Five Star Mfg. v. Comm'r, 355 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1966). See supra note 45
and accompanying text for a discussion of Five Star.
115. Bailine & Booth, supra note 95, at 94 TNT 215-62. Enactment of § 162(k)
by Congress took an expense (a "greenmail" payment) that arguably, under Five
Star, had become an "allowable" deduction and returned it to its historical status,
a non-deductible capital expenditure. See id. Under the initial inquiry, "greenmail"
payments, perhaps, had become "deductions otherwise allowable" on the authority
of Five Star. See id. However, under the second step of the inquiry, the
proscriptive language of § 162(k) would preclude deduction of "greenmail" payments because they were clearly made "in connection with a redemption." See id.
116. See Bailine & Booth, supra note 95, at 94 TNT 215-62.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit held that a corporation could deduct
fees which it incurred in obtaining debt capital used to redeem
stock even though § 162(k) disallows deduction of any expenses
: incurred "in connection with" a stock redemption. 1l7 The
court reasoned that the fees were incurred in a separate borrowing transaction which was not "in connection with" the
stock redemption and, thus, allowed amortization and deduction of the loan fees as ordinary and necessary business expenses under § 162(a).1l8
So far, the Ninth Circuit is the only United States Circuit
Court of Appeals to decide whether § 162(k) applies to fees
incurred in obtaining loans to finance a stock redemption. 1l9
However, this could change. Fort Howard Corp. intends to
appeal the United States Tax Court decision in Fort Howard
Corp. v. Commissioner 120 to the Seventh Circuit. 121 If the
Seventh Circuit were to affirm the tax court decision, a conflict
between the Ninth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit would result, leaving the question to be resolved by the United States
Supreme Court. 122

Robert G. Lorndale, Jr.'

117. In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, 27 F.3d 367, 370 (9th Cir. 1994).
118. See id.
119. See Claudia MacLachlan, Conflict Emerges In Rulings On Fee Deductions;
The Supreme Court May Have to Settle a Split Over Deducting Fees Paid In LBO
Financings, NAT'!. L.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at A7.
120. Fort Howard Corp. v. Comm'r, No. 6362-92, 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63
(T.C. Aug. 24, 1994).
121. MacLachlan, supra note 119, at A7. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of Fort Howard Corp. v. Comm'r.
122. See MacLachlan, supra note 119, at A7.
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